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L A B O R L A W
The Scope of Employer Liability for
Employee Exposure to a Hazardous Substance:
No Harm, No Foul?
by Barbara J. Fick
In 1908 Congress enacted the
Federal Employers' Liability Act
("FELA" or the "Act") which pro-
vides a remedy for railroad employ-
ees injured on the job. The princi-
ples governing recovery under FELA
have been derived primarily from
the common law of torts, the body
of judge-made law that provides
damages for personal and property
injury. (Refer to Glossary for the
definition of damages.)
Section 1 of the Act provides that
''every common carrier by railroad
... shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier ... for
such injury ... resulting ... from
the negligence ... of such carrier."
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
FELA differs from workers' compen-
sation statutes because it does not
make railroad employers absolutely
liable, i.e., liable without fault, for
work-related injuries suffered by
their employees; rather, the basis
for employer liability under the Act
is negligence, i.e., an employer's fail-
ure to use ordinary care. But like
workers' compensation laws, FELA
expressly abrogates several defenses
normally available in negligence
cases, such as the plaintiff's contrib-
utory negligence or assumption of
risk. Thus, FELA represents an
amalgam of the common law tort
concepts of negligence and injury
and statutory qualifications.
At issue in this case is whether
FELA provides a basis of recovery
for a railroad employee exposed to
asbestos who does not manifest any
asbestos-related disease.
ISSUES
1. Does FELA recognize a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress based solely on exposure to a
hazardous substance in the absence
of any actual or immediate physical
injury?
2. Can an employee recover the
costs of future medical monitoring
in the absence of physical injury?
FACTS
Michael Buckley began working for
the Metro-North Commuter Railroad





(Continued on Page 312)
\t
311l
Barbara J. Fick is associate
professor of law at Notre Dame
Law School, Notre Dame, IN;
(219) 631-5864.
The law, including work-
ers' compensation law,
has come to allow plain-
tiffs to recover for emo-
tional distress. But, as a
general rule, recovery
requires a physical injury.
This case asks the
Supreme Court to decide
if a railroad worker cov-
ered by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act
who has been exposed to
asbestos because of
employer negligence but
who has not developed an
asbestos-related disease









FROM: THE SECOND CIRCUIT
as a pipefitter, repairing and main-
taining the pipes in the steam tun-
nels below Grand Central Terminal
in New York. The pipes were cov-
ered with asbestos insulation which
Buckley had to remove before he
could perform maintenance or
repair work. The insulation would
break apart upon removal and cover
Buckley's skin and clothes. Buckley
and the other pipefitters were nick-
named the "snowmen of Grand
Central" because they would
emerge from the steam tunnels
covered from head to toe with
white asbestos powder.
Metro-North put Buckley to work
without providing any specialized
training in the handling or removal
of asbestos and without providing
him with a face mask, respirator,
or air-quality monitor. Indeed,
although Metro-North knew that the
insulation was asbestos, it did not
give that information to Buckley or
the other pipefitters working in the
tunnels until 1987, at which time it
instructed the employees on
asbestos removal and provided
respirators. Upon learning that
they were working with asbestos,
Buckley and the other pipefitters
contacted a lawyer. Buckley's case
was selected as the test case for the
other workers.
Buckley filed a complaint under
FELA in federal district court, seek-
ing damages for negligent infliction
of emotional distress and payment
of medical monitoring costs based
on his asbestos exposure. Metro-
North conceded its negligence, so
the only issues for trial were the
nature of Buckley's injury, its cause,
and damages.
At trial, Buckley's doctors, who
were specialists in asbestos-related
occupational disease, testified that
Buckley currently showed no signs
of disease, but they also noted that
the latency period for asbestos-relat-
ed disease was at least 10 years.
The doctors testified that as a result
of his exposure, Buckley suffered an
increased risk of dying from an
asbestos-related cancer.
Buckley himself testified that he is
fearful of developing an asbestos-
related disease, especially cancer,
and worries about his future. He did
not, however, undergo any psychi-
atric treatment or other type of
counseling for these fears.
At the close of Buckley's case,
Metro-North filed a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law, which the
district court granted and dismissed
the case. The district court, in an
unreported opinion, held that
Buckley did not suffer a sufficient
impact with asbestos to support a
claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and had failed to
prove that he had suffered a real
emotional injury. The court did not
address Buckley's claim for medical
monitoring costs.
Buckley appealed to the Second
Circuit which set aside the district
court's judgment and returned the
case to that court for trial. 79 F.3d
1337 (2d Cir. 1996).
The appeals court held that based
on Buckley's evidence a reasonable
jury could find that he had suffered
a physical impact with asbestos suf-
ficient to support his claim for emo-
tional distress. The court said that
asbestos fibers were embedded in
Buckley's lungs as a result of his
exposure and that this contact con-
stituted a physical impact; a jury
could find that this impact would
cause fear in a reasonable person.
Pointing to Buckley's testimony that
he had complained to his supervi-
sors and state authorities after
learning that the insulation was
asbestos and noting his testimony
about his fear of dying, the court
concluded that a reasonable jury
could find that Buckley suffered
emotional injury. Although the evi-
dence of emotional distress was not
overwhelming, the court held that
proof of severe distress is not
required when physical impact has
been proved. Finally, the court held
that the costs of future medical
monitoring for early detection and
treatment of any asbestos-related
disease were recoverable expenses
incurred as a result of the injury
sustained by Buckley.
Metro-North filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court to review the decision of the
Second Circuit, which the Court
granted. 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
In Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994),
5 ABA PREvIw 184 (Feb. 18, 1994),
the Supreme Court was presented
with the question of whether a
claim for emotional distress caused
by an employer's negligence consti-
tutes an injury for purposes of
Section 1 of FELA. Consistent with
FELA jurisprudence, the Court gave
great weight to common law tort
principles in answering this
question.
The Court noted that while nearly
all states have recognized a right to
recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, common law tort
principles operate to restrict both
the class of plaintiffs who may
recover for emotional distress and
the types of injuries that may be
compensated. These limitations are
based on several policy grounds
such as "the potential for a flood of
trivial suits, the possibility of fraud-
ulent claims ... , and the specter of
unlimited and unpredictable liabili-
ty." 114 S. Ct. at 2411. Thus, while
holding that claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress are
compensable under FELA, the Court
adopted the zone-of-danger test to
Issue No. 5312
limit the class of persons entitled to
recover damages for such injury.
The zone-of-danger test, the Court
reasoned, "limits recovery for emo-
tional injury to those plaintiffs who
sustain a physical impact as a result
of a defendant's negligent conduct,
or who are placed in immediate risk
of physical harm by that conduct."
114 S. Ct. at 2406.
The zone-of-danger test adopted by
the Gottshall Court is an exception
to the otherwise generally applica-
ble principle that a viable claim
under FELA requires an actual
injury. Thus, under the Gottshall
standard, an employee who is with-
in the zone of danger may recover
for emotional distress caused either
by an actual physical impact or by
being placed at immediate risk of
physical harm, even though no such
harm is sustained.
This case involves the application of
the Gottshall zone-of-danger test
when an employee is exposed to a
hazardous substance but, at the
time of suit, has suffered no actual
injury or disease. As noted above,
the Second Circuit held that
physical contact with asbestos fibers
constitutes a physical impact for
purposes of the zone-of-danger test.
And, indeed, the language used by
the Court in Gottshall focused on
physical impact and the risk of
physical harm, not on physical
injury.
The view of the Second Circuit,
however, conflicts with that of the
Third Circuit which concluded in
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., a case decided some 10 years
before Gottshall, that asbestos
exposure alone is insufficient to
constitute actual injury under
FELA. 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985).
Metro-North understandably relies
on Schweitzer, arguing that the
overwhelming majority of courts
deciding asbestos exposure cases,
whether decided under FELA, other
federal statutes, or the common law
of torts, follow Schweitzer's reason-
ing and require physical injury as a
prerequisite to recovery for emo-
tional distress based on exposure.
According to Metro-North, proof of
physical injury is necessary to pre-
vent clogging the courts with specu-
lative claims, awarding windfalls to
those who never fall ill and delaying
recovery for those who actually
contract disease.
Metro-North argues that by allowing
recovery merely because Buckley
had physical impact with asbestos,
the Second Circuit misread
Gottshall and ignored the common
law tort context in which the
Supreme Court developed the zone-
of-danger test. Here, Metro-North
notes that the Gottshall Court
linked recovery for emotional
distress to actual physical impact
or to an immediate risk of physical
impact.
Buckley's exposure to asbestos did
not place him at risk of imminent
harm, as the testimony at trial
established. Moreover, argues
Metro-North, any possible harm to
Buckley will occur, if at all, only in
the future. Thus, concludes
Metro-North, Buckley was never
within any zone of danger;
accordingly, he has no basis for
recovering under FELA.
Metro-North also contends that the
Second Circuit's failure to require
medical proof that Buckley's emo-
tional distress was severe and
resulted in a physical manifestation
is an unwarranted departure from
the common law tort principles that
govern liability under Section 1 of
FELA. Metro-North argues that
these principles are necessary both
to ensure that a claim for emotional
distress is not trivial or fraudulent
and to limit the variability and
unpredictability of damages awards
for emotional distress.
Buckley, on the other hand, con-
tends that the Second Circuit cor-
rectly applied prevailing tort law
principles which require proof of
severity only when the plaintiff has
not suffered a physical impact.
Since the Second Circuit concluded
that he had indeed suffered a physi-
cal impact, Buckley maintains that
he is entitled to recover for any
emotional distress caused by the
impact, even if the distress is not
severe or did not produce additional
bodily harm.
Turning to the issue of who should
pay for Buckley's medical monitor-
ing, Metro-North argues that the
Second Circuit's holding that it
should pay is contrary to the
requirements of FELA and estab-
lished tort law principles. Section 1
of FELA provides that railroad
employees may sue to recover dam-
ages for injuries caused by the
employer's negligence. In other
words, there can be no recovery
under FELA without an injury, and
Buckley was not injured. In Metro-
North's view, Buckley's claim for
medical monitoring is based on
exposure to asbestos, but mere
exposure is not an injury. Moreover,
even if Buckley's emotional distress
claim were held to be a compens-
able injury under FELA, Buckley is
not entitled to medical monitoring
costs because those costs have no
connection to his emotional injury.
Buckley is not seeking medical
monitoring because of his mental
condition; the medical monitoring
claim is connected to his asbestos
exposure which Buckley himself has
not alleged as an injury.
Buckley counters that recovery of
reasonable medical expenses flowing
from an employer's negligent con-
duct is a well-accepted element of
(Continued on Page 314)
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tort law and FELA. Buckley main-
tains that an employee's exposure to
a proven hazardous substance justi-
fies the need for medical monitor-
ing. Accordingly, proof of a present
injury is not required.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case is being watched closely
by railroad employers. Since 1990,
over 14,000 new asbestos claims
have been brought against American
railroads; over 2,000 claims have
been filed alleging exposure to
various other toxic substances.
These numbers can be expected to
increase dramatically if the Court
adopts the Second Circuit's analysis
expanding both the class of plain-
tiffs entitled to compensation under
FELA and the range of injuries that
are compensable.
The Supreme Court's decision in
this case also could have dramatic
ramifications beyond the railroad
industry. As explained, FELA gener-
ally reflects common law tort princi-
ples, and cases decided under FELA
frequently shape the development of
tort law doctrines applicable to
situations involving other types of
defendants.
It has been estimated that over
21 million workers have been signif-
icantly exposed to asbestos in the
40 years prior to 1980. Moreover,
as noted by one federal court,
"millions of people have suffered
exposure to hazardous substances."
Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp.
1344, 1372 (S.D. W.Va. 1990). If a
worker who has had nothing more
than regular contact with hazardous
substances in the workplace or an
individual who simply has been
exposed to hazardous substances
because of someone's negligence can
sue for damages, the potential liabil-
ity would be nearly limitless and
unpredictable.
The cost to defendants associated
solely with the asbestos lawsuits
filed before 1991 is approximately
$7 billion. At least 17 companies
have gone into bankruptcy because
of asbestos-related litigation.
The Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Asbestos Litigation
appointed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that asbestos
litigation has created major prob-
lems for the court system, causing
long pretrial delays, exhausting the
defendants' assets, and raising the
prospect that future claimants
may not be compensated at all.
Certainly, these problems will be
exacerbated by an extension of lia-
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